Abstract-The broadcast nature of radio propagation makes wireless networks vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks. To enhance authentication strength in wireless networks, various physical layer authentication schemes were proposed by exploiting physical layer characteristics. Recently, we proposed a novel PHYsical layer Phase Challenge-Response Authentication Scheme (PHY-PCRAS), which exploits both the reciprocity and randomness of the phase responses over independent parallel multicarrier channels. In this paper, we first extend it to more practical Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (OFDM) transmission. Then, security analysis is provided, and information-theoretic security is formulated for PHY-PCRAS over both independent and correlated subchannels. Finally, we propose a practical framework for incorporating the mechanism of physical layer authentication into the current Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol. Compared to the conventional 3GPP AKA protocol, the PHY-PCRAS assisted authentication process can ensure some degree of information-theoretic security. It is also possible to further protect the subsequent classic AKA process on the air through the physical layer secure information transmission technique.
I. INTRODUCTION

E
NSURING security of wireless communications has becoming increasingly important. Openness of wireless networks makes them vulnerable to spoofing attacks where an unauthorized user masquerades as another legitimate user. In the past, conventional cryptographic security mechanisms are used to foil such attacks [1] , [2] . However, it was believed that more efforts should be done to prevent potential innovative attacks since the wireless medium offers novel avenues for intrusion.
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measures are required. The openness of the radio interface makes the interception of data possible, which constitutes a main threat due to loss of confidentiality of sensitive user information. The open nature of wireless links can also facilitate the illegitimate access to wireless services, which is not only of concern with respect to proper billing, but also of concern with respect to masquerading: impersonating a network operator or service provider to intercept user data on the radio interface.
To prevent fraudulent use of wireless services, the second generation (2G) GSM network authenticates the identity of a user through a challenge-response mechanism, that is, the user proves its identity by providing a response to a time-variant challenge raised by the network. The GSM authentication and key agreement (hereafter called GSM-AKA) is simple, and the weaknesses of the GSM challenge-response protocol have been uncovered over time [3] . Hence, the third generation mobile system, Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS), has adopted an enhanced authentication and key agreement protocol resulted from the Third-Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). The protocol, known as UMTS-AKA, retains the framework of the GSM-AKA and provides significant enhancement to achieve additional goals such as mutual authentication, agreement on an integrity key between the user and the serving network, and freshness assurance of agreed cipher key and integrity key.
Later, it was shown that the UMTS-AKA protocol is still vulnerable to redirection attack [4] , where an adversary, which equipped with the functionality of both a base station and a mobile station, has the capability to relay messages in between a legitimate mobile station and a genuine base station. A new authentication and key agreement protocol was proposed in [4] to defeat redirection attack. In order to enhance UMTS-AKA, a new version of 3GPP AKA protocol, known as Evolved Packet System AKA (EPS-AKA), has been proposed for the Long Term Evolution (LTE) system. Potential security vulnerability on the LTE architecture has been demonstrated in [5] - [7] .
It should be pointed out that the security of the state-of-theart EPS-AKA protocol comes from computational complexity, namely, the adversary has limited power on computation. In recent years, there has been increased interests on physical (PHY) layer security, which can achieve some degree of information-theoretic security [8] and make the adversaries hopeless even if they have unlimited power on computation. Indeed, various efforts [9] - [12] have been made in authenticating the sender and receiver at the PHY layer, based on prior coordination or shared secrets, where the sender is authenticated if the receiver can successfully demodulate and decode the transmission. Among various reported works, it was commonly observed that the physical properties of the wireless medium are a powerful source of domain-specific information that can be used to complement and enhance traditional security mechanisms [9] .
The idea of exploiting the short term reciprocity of the radio channel was first employed in [13] for secure information transmission. In [14] , we exploited the essential idea to propose a novel PHYsical layer Phase Challenge-Response Authentication Scheme (PHY-PCRAS) for multicarrier transmission. It employs the channel-phase response, which is unique for the transmitter-receiver pair in typical wireless communications scenarios.
In this paper, we first extend PHY-PCRAS to more practical OFDM transmission, with main focus on the security penalty due to the correlation among subchannels. Then, we propose a practical framework for incorporating PHY-PCRAS into the 3GPP AKA protocol, which may be a first attempt for strengthening the practical AKA protocol with the physical layer authentication mechanism.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1) PHY-PCRAS [14] is extended to practical OFDM transmission with M -ary phase-shift keying (M -PSK) modulation, and a semi-analytic expression is provided for successful authentication rate with a given false acceptance rate. 2) We provide a security analysis on PHY-PCRAS with special emphasis on the effect of correlation over OFDM subchannels. In particular, information-theoretic security is formulated and a first-order Markov fading channel model is employed to compute the upper bound on the amount of information Eve can get about the key. 3) A novel framework for incorporating physical challengeresponse authentication process into the traditional AKA protocol is proposed, which, we believe, is a first attempt in this direction. The introduction of physical layer authentication can strengthen the system security as the information-theoretic security can be partially guaranteed. 4) With the introduction of PHY-PCRAS, it is also possible to further protect the subsequent AKA process on the air through the physical layer secure information transmission technique [13] for achieving information-theoretic security. 5) The proposed PHY-PCRAS is compared with PHY-CRAM [10] , which employs the randomness of fading channel's amplitude. PHY-PCRAS shows its advantage in performance. We also present numerical results for impersonation attacks and it shows that PHY-PCRAS is more robust for impersonation attacks, compared to PHY-CRAM. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. PHY-PCRAS is briefly reviewed and its application to practical OFDM transmission is investigated in detail in Section II. In Section-III, the security analysis is provided with emphasis on the effect of correlation over OFDM subchannels. Section-IV presents simulation results. A novel framework for use of physical layer authentication in 3GPP AKA protocol is proposed in Section-V and the conclusion is made in Section-VI.
II. PHY-PCRAS FOR OFDM TRANSMISSION
We first present a brief review of PHY-PCRAS [14] in a selfcontained manner for multi-carrier transmission, but with Mary phase-shift keying for modulating the shared key. Then, we extend it to practical OFDM transmission, and the successful authentication rate for a given false acceptance rate is derived in a semi-analytic form for correlated parallel fading channels. Finally, the impact of receiver oscillator on PHY-PCRAS is discussed.
A. PHY-PCRAS for Multi-Carrier Transmission
As a challenge-response process, the one-way authentication process from Alice to Bob in PHY-CRAS is shown in Fig.  1 . Alice sends a challenge signal to Bob, Bob sends back a response signal, which can be verified by Alice with the shared secret key. With multi-carrier transmission, L carriers at
It was assumed that L carriers are well separated for ensuring independent fading.
Suppose that the shared keys between Alice and Bob are denoted as {K A , K B }, where each key can be considered as a sequence of random bits. For one-way authentication, only one key is necessary, while for mutual authentication, two keys are used.
Security of the system relies on the secrecy of {K A , K B }. If an attacker knows {K A , K B }, she or he has the ability to impersonate either Alice or Bob.
1) PHY-Challenge: Consider that Alice wants to start a conversation with Bob. Alice sends a "challenge" frame to Bob, which is employed by Bob for estimation of channel phases at multiple carriers. Essentially, Alice sends equalphase modulated sinusoids at frequencies
Assuming the sinusoids cos(2πf i t) are mutually orthogonal and are all separated from each other by the channel coherence bandwidth. At the receiver, the received signal in the noiseless setting can be represented as
where h i , i = 1, 2, · · · , L are independent and identically (Gaussian) distributed random complex variables with zero mean and normalized variance, and ∠(h i ) = θ i are channel phase responses at L carriers. Hence, a parallel Rayleigh fading channel model is assumed. Then, Bob extracts the phase differences between subcarriers f i and f 1 , namely,
For the use of differential phases, we mean that the reciprocity of channel phases cannot hold strictly, which is sensitive to the difference of two time delays, namely, δt(Alice Fig. 1 . A novel challenge-response authentication scheme for multi-carrier transmission.
δt(Bob → Alice). In practice, this delay difference cannot be zero, which may result in noticeable phase difference at large carrier frequencies. Furthermore, the reciprocity of channel phases is also closely related to the implementation of the receiver, where the channel phase can be changed in the process of signal down-conversion from radio frequency to base-band due to use of the oscillators. Hence, the use of differential phases can facilitate the implementation, we shall further discuss this point in the end of this section. For ease of analysis, one can describe the system as a set of L parallel fading channels, each at a subcarrier with frequency f i and the received discrete-time samples take the form of
where w i is the additive complex white Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance of γ Let h i = |h i |e jθi , the received signal can be written as
By differentiating over the carriers f i and f 1 , we essentially form the metric
for extracting ∆θ i1 , i = 2, · · · , L. Then, an estimate of ∆θ i1 can be computed as
2) PHY-Response: At this stage, Bob responds to Alice with a tagged signal, which encapsulates the shared key
T in the form of
where
Hence, the received signal at the side of Alice in the noiseless setting is given by
where θ i e = ∆θ i1 − ∆θ i1 . Due to the orthogonality among different sub-carriers, one can retrieve the discrete signal vector from a noisy version of (9) 
T , where
s . Hence, the received vector in its complex form can be written as
3) Random Data Modulation for Preventing Probing:
To prevent an attacker from probing the channel, Alice can employ a M -ary random sequence
for modulating the sinusoids at multiple carriers as the challenge signal, namely,
Then, the same verification procedure can be implemented except that the key should be accordingly modified asκ i → κ i · d i .
B. PHY-PCRAS for OFDM Transmission
Now, let us consider more practical OFDM transmission. For a wireless multipath fading channel, it often associates with a channel coherence time T c , below which the channel is considered as temporally correlated.
Assuming an OFDM system with N subcarriers, a bandwidth of W Hz and symbol length of T f = T u + T g seconds, of which, T g seconds are due to the length of cyclic prefix (CP), and T u = N/W . With the sampling period of T = T u /N = 1/W , the number of resulting samples for each OFDM symbol is N f = N +N g , where N g denotes the length of CP.
The signal is transmitted over a frequency-selective fading channel
where τ i is the delay of the i-th path and α i (t) is the corresponding complex amplitude. If the Doppler spread caused by relative speed between two participants are neglected, there is no inter-carrier interference (ICI) in the system. As a result, the OFDM system can be considered as the superposition of N independent narrow band subsystems that experience flat-fading channels, and each subsystem during the n-th OFDM symbol period [nT f , (n+1)T f ) is modelled simply by
with ∆f = W/N . Here, we assume the channel to be fixed over an OFDM symbol interval, namely,
Later in Section-III, we shall show that the security of PHY-PCRAS favors independent parallel subchannels, which, however, cannot be assured for practical OFDM transmission. Therefore, it is important to allocate the subchannels for achieving the best possible independence among them.
In general, it is possible to view OFDM as transmission of data over a lattice in the time-frequency plane. Let T × F be two-dimensional indexes for time-frequency lattices, where F is the set of indexes for subcarriers and T is the set of indexes for OFDM symbols. To ensure independence among L subchannels in its best effort, one has to find a sequence of index
in two-dimensional time-frequency slots for minimizing the mutual correlation among any two subchannels, namely,
. In practice, both sizes of T and F are limited. Therefore, the allocation of time-frequency slots is subject to such practical constraints. It is interesting to see that the allocation of timefrequency slots for minimizing the correlation (15) is similar to the allocation of pilots over time-frequency slots encountered in channel estimation for OFDM systems. Hence, pilot allocation, along with pilot-based channel estimation [15] , in practical OFDM systems can be well employed to extract the channel-phase responses (7) required in PHY-CRAS. As the correlation among any two subchannels is determined by the system channel model, we discuss two models in what follows.
1) 3GPP channel model:
The channel models described in [16] comprise of large number of paths, where path powers follow the model of exponential channel shape and the delay spreads are close to expected medians in typical models. In simulations, we focus on the typical urban channel model with 20 multipaths, where each path endures independent but timwarying fading, a fading which is well described by Rayleigh distributed amplitudes varying according to a classical Doppler spectrum
with f D denoting the maximum Doppler shift. The channels have been normalised so that the total power in each channel is equal to one. Then, the correlation between h n1 k1 and h n2 k2 can be computed as
] is the multipath intensity profile. It should be pointed out that 3GPP channel models are recommended for the purpose of system simulations, which are far from the purpose of obtaining the exact channel statistic properties. Indeed, the 3GPP channel models assume that the path delays are fixed, which is not the case in practice.
2) Jakes phase decorrelation model:
In [17] , Jake presented a mathematical analysis of phase correlation between two separated carriers when they transmitted from a base station to a mobile user. In a typical urban environment, the received signal is the superpositions of a large number of scatted signals, arising from multiple scattering of the waves by building or other structures in the vicinity of the mobile user. Hence, Jake's channel model can be finely constructed using statistic method.
In essence, Jake considers a transmitter emitting two carrier wave tones at radio frequencies f 1 and f 2 . Then, the phase correlation between two carriers at the receiver is a function of frequency separation ∆f = f 2 − f 1 . More precisely, the normalized phase correlation between two carriers at the receiver can be written as
Note here that ∆t is the transmission time delay, σ τ is the time delay spread, and J 0 (x) denotes the zero-order Bessel function of the fist kind. For ρ θ (∆f, 0) = 0.1, it is required that ∆f = 576 kHz at σ τ = 0.5µs. It was reported that σ τ = 0.5µs in typical urban areas [16] .
C. Verification
To complete the authentication process, Alice requires to verify that whether the response signal y is from Bob or not. If the response signal is not from Bob but Eve (an impersonation attacker), it is assumed that Eve generates a length-L Mary random vector K E for authentication as there is no any information about K B available to Eve. Essentially, this is cast as a binary hypothesis testing problem [18] :
where K t denotes the acknowledged key. The optimum binary hypothesis testing was formulated in [14] , which is difficult to solve in general. Instead, we propose to use the test statistic ζ = |η| with
and ζ is further compared to a threshold value ε for making a final decision.
D. Successful Authentication Rate vs. False Acceptance Rate
In both hypotheses, η is the sum of L dependent identicallydistributed random variables, which could be approximately regarded as normally distributed for large L from the central limit theorem, especially when the dependence among random variables is weak. Therefore, it suffices to compute its mean and variance.
Clearly, the derivation process [14] holds again. After power detection, the envelope ζ = |η| obeys Rice distribution and the cumulative distribution function of which can be expressed as
Hi are the mean and variance of η under hypothesis H i , respectively.
The authentication is typically claimed if |η| ≥ ε. The threshold ε of this test is determined for a false acceptance rate (or false alarm probability) α according to the distribution of η|H 0 ε = arg max
The successful authenticate rate (or detection probability) can be simply computed as
E. The Impact of Receiver Oscillator
For practical implementation of PHY-PCRAS for multicarrier transmission, the phase responses at each subcarrier will carry the effect of hardware imperfection of the local receiver, especially in the case where the receiver is equipped with multiple local oscillators.
Consider that L local oscillators available at the receivers for both Alice and Bob. Without any phase-error correction, the challenge-response process can be shown in Fig. 2 , where the phases ϑ 
. In practice, this receiver structure can be well avoided by using digital FFT and only one local oscillator is required. Hence, this effect can be largely remedied, which means that ϑ
With the use of phase differences (but not the absolute channel phases), we have again that ∆θ i = ∆θ i , i = 1, · · · , L as shown in Fig.  2 . At the side of Alice, the introduction of constant phase ϑ A means nothing for the problem of authentication, as it can also be viewed as PN code acquisition.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Adversary Model
Eve, as the adversary, is an aware receiver and knows the authentication scheme that Alice and Bob are using. However, she does not know the shared secret keys between Alice and Bob. She can be a passive attacker or an active attacker. As an active attacker, Eve can perform three types of attacks, including jamming attacks, replay attacks and impersonation attacks.
B. Passive Attacks
As a passive attacker, Eve only monitors all frames inside the network during authentication, and tries to learn (K A , K B ) from whatever it gets.
Firstly, Eve cannot get a feasible estimate about ∆θ i1 based on the monitoring signal when Alice initiates a challenge, since ∆θ i1 is channel-dependent. 
The effect of receivers' oscillators on the proposed challenge-response authentication scheme.
By monitoring the response signal from Bob, the received signal at the side of Eve in the noiseless setting is given by
whereh i = |h i |e jθi , andθ i is Eve's channel-phase response if Bob is assumed to transmit a zero-phase sinusoid signal at frequency f i and ∆θ i1 =θ i −θ 1 .
Due to the orthogonality among different sub-carriers, one can retrieve the discrete signal vector from a noisy version of (26) as z
Let Z 
where I(X; Y ) denotes the mutual information between two random variables X and Y . 1) Independent parallel fading channels: As Eve can not be very close to Alice, it is fair to assume that ∆θ i1 is independent of ∆θ i1 .
If the parallel fading channels between Alice and Bob are independent, we have that both ∆θ i1 and ∆θ i1 , i = 2, · · · , L are unformly distributed over [0, 2π). Hence, (∆θ i1 − ∆θ i1 ), i = 2, · · · , L are also uniformly distributed over [0, 2π) due to the independence between ∆θ i1 and ∆θ i1 , which means that I(Z L 1 ; K B ) = 0. Therefore, there is no hope for Eve to extract any reliable information about the key K A . Furthermore, the use of random data sequence D A for challenge at the side of Alice could make it completely hopeless.
2) Correlated parallel fading channels:
For practical OFDM transmission, the parallel fading channels are often correlated.
Consider there is only one passive attacker, Eve, who listens over the open air link to decode the key so that she can impersonate the legitimate user whenever she wants. To impersonate Bob, Eve must do her best to decode the shared key between Alice and Bob. As Bob responds with the shared key when Alice challenges, Eve is assumed to be very close to Bob but far away from Alice, in which case Eve can optimistically have thatθ i = 0, which means that
If Bob can resolve the channel phase accurately (in the noiseless case),θ i1 = θ i1 , the signal model (29) can be equivalently written as
where x i = e j(ϕi) andh i = |h i |e −j(θi−θ1) . For information-theoretic security, it is essential to compute the mutual information I(Z
In a similar manner, we can also define X L 1 . Hence, the mutual information (28) can be bounded as
It should be pointed out that the mutual information
cannot assume any information about the channel realizationsh i , i = 1, · · · , L due to the inaccessibility of θ i at the side of Eve, hence a non-coherent case is considered [19] . With independent parallel channels, the noncoherent capacity is simply zero.
For further obtaining a feasible bound on the mutual information, we consider a first-order Markov model for the correlated fading channel as follows
with γ E denoting the SNR at the side of Eve, and α = E{h i+1h * i } for normalized channels, i.e., E{|h i | 2 } = 1. In this case, the mutual information (31) can be well upper bounded as [19] 
for constant-amplitude inputs, namely,
it is an interesting topic for Eve how to attack the shared key between Alice and Bob by exploiting the nonzero mutual information in practice.
Here, we consider a direct attack approach at the side of Eve, where the key is directly decoded from the received signal. If Eve is very close to Bob, one can simply assume the noiseless case of w i = 0. In this case, decoding of the key is mainly determined by the random variable ∆θ i1 , which is clearly related to phase correlation among subchannels and γ AB , i.e., the SNR between Alice and Bob.
For PHY-PCRAS, the shared key is, in fact, conveyed in the carrier phase differences among subchannels. Hence, it should be pointed out that the essential length of the key is L − 1 with the form of (8) . As the individual bits of the key are independently distributed, Eve has to estimatê κ i = g(z i , z 1 ), i = 2, · · · , L for possible recovery of the key, where g(·, ·) is a decoding function.
Let P e = Pr (κ i = κ i ) denote the symbol error probability of the decoded key. To ensure security, it is desirable to require that P e = 0.5 at the side of Eve. Whenever there are correlations among subchannels, this cannot always hold. However, it is possible to decrease the SNR between Alice and Bob by adjusting the transmit power so that P e −→ 0.5 while the verification can still be relievablely ensured. This is possible as the verification is decided by accumulating the energy over a block of key symbols as shown in the simulations.
C. Impersonation Attacks 1) Mutual authentication:
Eve can initiate an authentication request. In this way, she impersonates Alice and may steal K B from the response of Bob. As discussed in [10] , this problem can be solved with mutual authentication by sharing two distinguished keys, K A and K B , between Alice and Bob. After Bob has been authenticated by Alice, Bob also authenticates Alice; if Alice cannot provide a valid response, Bob would consider that its shared key has been compromised and revoke it.
2) Partial knowledge attacks: We also consider that Eve may have partial knowledge about the key, which may be possible when Eve is close to Bob and the parallel fading channels between Alice and Bob are unfortunately correlated. It is clear that the effectiveness of this attack is determined by the knowledge about the key available at the side of Eve.
Let β denotes the ratio of known bits versus the binary length of key. Whenever Eve, as a passive attacker, decodes the key with a recovery bit error probability of P e , it should be noted that β = H(P e ), where H(x) = −x log 2 x − (1 − x) log 2 (1 − x). Hence, P e = 0.11 means that β = 0.5.
To defeat against partial knowledge attacks, Alice and Bob have to increase the detection threshold ε to lower the false acceptance rate. Simulations show that this is possible if β is not very large.
D. Jamming Attacks
One way that Eve can try to prevent the authentication is through corruption. She can do jamming when Alice sends the challenge signal. If Bob cannot be authenticated by Alice due to jamming, which means the denial of service. However, the frequent jamming in the stage of challenge is apt to being detectable.
She can also do jamming while Bob response to Alice. This signal may be viewed as interference and, hence, may be combatted by increasing the bit-length of shared key. If the jamming signal is not AWGN-like, it can be suppressed through conventional interference rejection techniques.
E. Replay Attacks
Eve may be interested in having Alice accept inauthentic messages (i.e., the messages that someone other than Bob transmits). Eve can simply replay a message that Bob transmitted in the past. However, since the channel-phase response between two legitimate users is unique and cannot be revealed to Eve, the received signal by Alice should take a similar form of (26) and Alice will not accept it.
In the optimistic case, it seems that Eve has the potential to recover the key K A . However, the introduction of random data modulation for preventing probing at the side of Alice can make this recovery useless. When Alice challenges with random data sequence D, Eve must recover K A ⊕ D, which is hopeless.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
We now present some computer simulation examples to demonstrate the effectiveness of PHY-PCRAS for OFDM transmission over typical 3GPP mobile channels.
Consider that the system operates at carrier frequency of 1.9 GHz. Each subchannel occupies with 15 kHz, and N = 2048 parallel subchannels are obtained using both IFFT and FFT, among which, L subchannels with equal bandwidth interval are selected for challenge-response authentication. With BPSK modulation, the number of parallel channels is equal to the binary length of key, while for QPSK modulation the number of parallel channels should be reduced to half of the binary key length.
The urban channel defined in [16] is selected as the channel model, with 20 multipaths and maximum delay spread of 2.14µs.
A. Selection of OFDM Subchannels
We adopt the Jakes phase decorrelation model for seletion of OFDM subchannels. For the case of ρ θ (∆f, 0) = 0.1, it is required that ∆f = 576 kHz for σ τ = 0.5µs in typical urban areas [16] .
If the number of subchannels in single OFDM sysmbol is not enough for sufficient decorrelation, one can futher allocate subchannels from sufficiently time-separated OFDM symbols. For Jakes model, the time decorrelation between n 1 -th OFDM symbol and n 2 -th OFDM symbol at the same subchannel
Therefore, it is reasonable to force that
For 3GPP-Tu50 channel model, where the mobile speed is 50 km/h, it results in |n 2 −n 1 | > 65. We take LTE for example. The frame structure of the LTE system consists of 10 ms long radio frames, each containing 20 slots of 0.5 ms duration. Therefore, it is possible to allocate at least three OFDM symbols among each 10-ms frame, which are approximately independent when transmitted over the typical 3GPP-Tu50 channel.
B. Performance under 3GPP Channel Model
Through extensive Monte-Carlo simulations, we investigate the probability density function (pdf) of ζ under two hypothesis H i , i = 0, 1, which can be well employed to evaluate both successful authentication and false acceptance rates. The proper choice of the threshold ε can also be determined from the pdfs of ζ. With L = 64 subchannels selected among N = 2048 OFDM subchannels for a single OFDM symbol, Fig. 3 shows empirical pdfs of ζ|H 1 and ζ|H 0 at SNR=5 dB. As claimed in Section-III, ζ|H 1 and ζ|H 0 are both Rice distributed. Hence, Rice distributions are also given in both figures, where
Hi , i = 0, 1 are directly estimated through Monte-Carlo simulations [20] . As shown, the theoretical Rice distributions are coincided well with the empirical distributions even though L subchannels are correlated. Since the pdf of ζ|H 1 is far apart from that of ζ|H 0 even at the SNR of 5 dB, the threshold value τ can be easily determined if the successful authentication rate or false acceptance rate is given. Fig. 4 demonstrates the nearly-ideal Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) (successful authentication rate versus false acceptance rate), which can be calculated through empirical pdfs with proper setting of threshold values. We can also allocate subchannels in time-frequency OFDM slots. Consider that L = 64 OFDM subchannels are allocated over two OFDM symbols, separated each other with 65 OFDM symbols apart, and at each OFDM symbol there are L/2 = 32 subcarriers selected with equal bandwidth interval. Fig. 5 shows empirical pdfs of ζ|H 1 and ζ|H 0 at SNR=5 dB in this case. Clearly, better performance can be achieved compared to Fig. 3 as the subchannels are now more independent.
C. Security Issues
1) The effect of subchannel correlations among OFDM subchannels: With L = 64 subchannels selected among N = 2048 OFDM subchannels for a single OFDM symbol, the normalized cross-correlation in the 3GPP Tu-50 channel model (the fixed-delay model) is ρ = 0.485. With a firstorder Markov fading model, we have that |α| = ρ = 0.485. According to (33), I(Z L 1 ; K B ) < 0.387L. We also report the recovery bit error probability if Eve wants to decode the shared key between Alice and Bob. Consider that Eve is very close to Bob and a noiseless link is assumed between Bob and Eve. In the case of γ AB = 5 dB, we run Monte-Carlo simulations over typical urban channels to show the recovery bit error probability versus key length. As shown in Fig. 6 , the recovery bit error probability is around 0.5 for the binary key length of 128 (or below) with BPSK modulation and of 256 (or below) with QPSK modulation, which makes the recovery of key hopeless. Clearly, the use of higher-order modulation scheme can strengthen the security as it is more vulnerable to phase noises among subchannels. The zigzag shape of Fig. 6 is due to the employment of 3GPP fixed delay model, where the decorrelation does not simply decrease as the frequency interval of selected subchannels increases.
2) Impersonation attacks with partial knowledge: In practice, Eve may initiate an impersonation attack with partial knowledge about the key. This partial knowledge about the key may be available when Eve is close to Bob and the parallel fading channels between Alice and Bob are unfortunately correlated. Fig. 7 shows the probability density functions of ζ|H 1 and ζ|H 0 at SNR=10 dB with half of key bits available (β = 0.5, L = 128). As the pdfs of ζ|H 1 and ζ|H 0 are well separated, the ideal ROC curve can be obtained.
In Fig. 8 , the ROC curve is given for the worse scenarios, where 3/4 of key bits are available at the side of Eve and low SNR of 5 dB is assumed. With L = 64 subcarriers, QPSK modulation supports 128 bits of key, which shows better performance than the BPSK modulation, which supports only 64 bits of key. 
D. Comparison with PHY-CRAM
As a mutual physical challenge-response authentication scheme, the PHY-CRAM proposed in [10] was shown to be simple, low complexity, robust, and flexible. Hence, it is interesting to compare PHY-PCRAS with PHY-CRAM.
For ROC performance, PHY-PCRAS is better as shown in Fig. 9 . Indeed, PHY-CRAM employs amplitude modulation, which is often worse than phase modulation in performance. For implementation, high peak fluctuations may occur with PHY-CRAM, due to the employment of amplitude modulation. Hence, it requires to suppress the high peak in practice with additional complexity. PHY-PCRAS, however, is more sensitive to the frequency offset compared to PHY-CRAM.
Whenever there exists correlation among subchannels, both schemes are susceptible in security. However, PHY-PCRAS is more secure than PHY-CRAM with impersonation attacks, as the channel-phase response is more sensitive to the distance between the transmitter and receiver compared to the channel- amplitude response and its ROC performance is better.
V. A NOVEL HYBRID AUTHENTICATION PROCESS FOR ENHANCING 3GPP AKA PROTOCOL A. The Proposed Hybrid Authentication Process
Although various physical-layer authentication schemes were proposed in the past years, there is, however, no any report on their practical applications in mobile authentication protocols. In this section, we propose a framework for integration of 3GPP authentication process with physical layer challenge-response authentication schemes.
Note that in general, the physical layer challenge-response authentication schemes can be well integrated into various 3GPP AKA protocols. In this section, we focus on the possibility of incorporating physical layer challenge-response authentication process into EPS-AKA protocol. As the essential authentication mechanism of EPS-AKA is similar to that of UMTS-AKA, the proposed framework is also applicable to UMTS-AKA.
LTE system has two main networks, the Evolved-Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) which is the access network (a network of eNBs), and the Evolved Packet Core (EPC) which is the core network. This structure makes LTE simple, scalable and efficient. To achieve a mutual authentication between the User Equipment (UE) and the Mobility Management Entity (MME) through the E-UTRAN, the SAE/LTE architecture enhances UMTS-AKA and presents a new access security approach, EPS-AKA to avoid the attacks existing in the UMTS systems. In addition, a new key hierarchy and handover key management mechanism has been introduced in order to ensure the security of the access and the mobility process in the LTE architecture.
When an UE connects to the EPC over the E-UTRAN, the MME represents the EPC to perform a mutual authentication with the UE by the EPS-AKA protocol.
To enhance the security of EPS-AKA protocol, we propose a novel hybrid authentication process by introducing an additional mutual physical layer challenge-response authentication process as shown in Fig. 10 . It is assumed that communication between eNB and MME is always secure and therefore we simply omit the connection process between them. Compared to EPS-AKA, the newly introduced mechanism is highlighted by red color. The classic mutual authentication process is still employed as did in EPS-AKA, which is further combined with PHY-PCRAS. For mutual physical layer challenge-response authentication, it requires that the UE and the eNB share a pair of keys (AKL, AKR). For producing the shared keys (AKL, AKR) between UE and eNB through HSS, one has to introduce a new hashing function f p (·, ·) for producing (AKL, AKR), namely, AKL = f p (K, RAN DL), AKR = f p (K, RAN DR), where (RAN DL, RAN DR) are newly introduced random numbers and K is the long-term secret key shared between the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) and the Authentication Center (AuC).
The proposed hybrid authentication process can be illustrated in detail by referring to Fig. 10 as follows.
1) Steps 1-2: When the UE receives the user identity request, it sends its identity (IMSI) in the user identity response message to eNB which forwards it to MME. 2) Steps 3-5: The MME sends an authentication data request message to the Home Subscriber Server/Authentication Center (HSS/AuC) to retrieve the AVs. The HSS/AuC generates an array of AVs, and returns them to the eNB via MME through the authentication data response message. This step is called the Authentication Data Request and Response (ADR) operation. An AV contains 5 normal elements, namely, a random challenge RAND, a network authentication token AU T N , an expected user response XRES, a cipher key CK, and an integrity key IK, a session key K ASME and 4 newly introduced elements: a pair of random variables (RAN DL, RAN DR) and a corresponding pair of authentication keys (AKL, AKR).
3)
Step 6: The MME selects the next unused AV in the AV array to perform the security function. Then the eNB sends a user PHY authentication request with parameters RAN DL and RAN DR to the UE. 4) Step 7: The UE computes the pair of authentication keys (AKL, AKR) by (RAN DL, RAN DR). 5) Steps 8-9: The UE initiates a PHY challenge-L, then the eNB gets back a PHY Response-L with the shared key AKL. The UE authenticates the eNB by verifying AKL. 6) Steps 10-11: The eNB initiates a PHY challenge-R, then the UE gets back a PHY Response-R with the shared key AKR. The eNB authenticates the UE by verifying AKR. 7) Steps 12-13: After successful mutual PHY authentication, the traditional authentication process starts. The MME sends a user authentication request with parameters RAN D and AU T N to the MS. The UE authenticates the MME by verifying AU T N . After successfully authenticating the network, the UE computes the user response RES by RAN D and preshared key, and then sends RES to the MME through user authentication response. 8) Step 14: The MME compares RES with XRES. If they are matched, the UE is successfully authenticated. As shown in Fig.10 , Steps. 12 and 14 can be further protected by using the physical secure information transmission technique proposed in [13] , in which the information bits can be securely conveyed in the differences of carrier phases among OFDM subchannels just like in PHY-PCRAS while its challenge-phase (please refer to [13] ) can be simply omitted, but shares in common with the PHY-PCRAS shown in Steps. 8 and 10.
B. Information-Theoretical Security
The security of 3GPP authentication process depends on the computational hardness of inverting hashing functions. Indeed, most modern cryptographic schemes aim for computationalsecurity. They can be broken given enough computation, just not in a reasonable amount of time.
In the 3GPP challenge-response authentication process, the response RES is the output of a hashing function, where the challenge RAN D and the shared key K are inputs. As both RES and RAN D are available at the side of the adversary, she or he can recover the shared secret key K with enough computational power at least in theory. However, this is not the case for the physical layer challenge-response authentication schemes. With independent parallel channels, we have shown that the adversary cannot have better possibility to derive the shared key than a random guess attacker. Hence, we claim that the physical layer challenge-response authentication are information-theoretically secure, since the adversary simply does not have enough "information" to succeed in its attack regardless of its computational power.
The introduction of physical layer secure information transmission in Steps. 12 and 14 can further provide informationtheoretic secure protection for the transmission of traditional challenge-response authentication messages. Hence, we conclude that with the proposed hybrid authentication process shown in Fig. 10 , the wireless air link between UE and eNB can now achieve almost the same security as that of the wired communication link, since eavesdroppers cannot get any information about the authentication process, whenever the selected parallel OFDM subchannels are nearly uncorrelated.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
PHY-PCRAS is investigated in detail for practical OFDM transmission. The effect of correlation among OFDM subchannels is analyzed from the information-theoretic security. Then, we present a practical framework for incorporating the physical layer challenge-response authentication mechanism into the state-of-the-art EPS-AKA protocol.
Both analytic and simulation results show that the proposed PHY-PCRAS can achieve some degree of informationtheoretic security, the degree of which depends on the correlation among the selected OFDM subchannels. Hence, the introduction of physical layer authentication mechanism, along with physical secure information transmission technique [13] , can strengthen the security of open-air link and make it work like a wired link as shown in Fig. 10 .
Finally, we point out that the proposed hybrid 3GPP authentication process is a first attempt, but far from completed. It is interesting to further investigate its impacts on security in various LTE authentication scenarios, especially the handover scenario.
For security analysis, a first-order Markov fading channel model was employed in this paper to compute an upper bound on the amount of information Eve can get about the key. It remains an open problem to tightly bound the informationtheoretic security for correlated parallel fading channels.
